**First topic: game theory redistribution**

1. **„The price of virtue” V.Foster**: Authors ask “what are people willing to pay for services provided by charitable sector”. Attempt to measure the value of the sector in terms of willingness to pay (WTP). This is fucking amazing, they used different techniques including questionnaires to measure this WTP. **Chapter 5** gives a summary of these attempts. If we can find a WTP that doesn’t materialize because there is no market, we can try to capture it. “Morality is not irrelevant, but it must account adequately for opportunity cost. Second part of the book is about how we go about capturing the extra WTP. **Chapter 6** says tax incentives not great (countereffect of less after tax money). Chapter 7, efforts of fundraisers most important, chapter about most efficient methods for approaching donors (I don’t care). Part III is a discussion, “social capital”. **Chapter 10** gives conclusions on capturing WTP.
   1. **Ch 1. Conceptual foundations:** Welfare economics, social welfare function. Bethamite utility function, change in welfare. Authors show how they use it specifically for charities.
   2. **Ch 2. Value of charities for the general public:** Interesting distinction, “tax efficient” vs not “tax efficient”. Chapter 2.3 is gold for my paper!!!! Note: how do I show that people would give more according to my game theory?
   3. **Ch 5. The aggregate benefits of the charitable sector, summary:** Last paragraph – there seems to be a gap between WTP and actual contributions, maybe for the gov. to fill with grants?
   4. **Ch 6.** **Providing fiscal incentives for giving:** In this chapter there is an overview of literature on charitable giving, picture in phone.
   5. **Ch 10.** **Conclusions and policy implications:** Pictures o phone

Welfare economics. Free riding and perceived transaction costs are the biggest reasons for the WTP surplus. 3 suggested methods for tackling this: gov. grants, fiscal incentives for giving, increased charity fundraising efforts. Tax incentives turn out to be inefficient(inecastic correlation), fundraising better. !! ch.6? By reducing fiscal incentives and giving money straight to charity might be better for the Exchequer. !! Social cost of raising funds may be greater for the charity than for the tax men! Government grants win, best of the three!

Continue notes!!!

1. **”The bounds of reason” H.Gintis:** The book looks cool. It’s new and open mided about game theory.
   1. **Ch 3. Geme theory and human behavior**
      1. Page 57-.., “The rationality of altruistic giving”!!! “public goods game” “inequality aversion”

GARP

3.1.5 Conditional altruistic cooperation- this is gold, these are my taxes – Toshia Yamgishi(“bounded rational reciprocity… 1999”) + Kionari, Better! (“Social exchange and reciprocity” 2000)

3.1.9 Altruism and cooperation in groups. Public goods game. Continue notes!

* + 1. Page 82-85, Public Goods Game across countries. “antisocial punishment”. Very interesting, picture on my phone.

1. **Advances in public economics: Utility, choice and welfare:** not useful for me
2. **Games, Rationality and Behaviour, Essays A.Innocenti:** 
   1. **I.2 Social norms in Game Theory**
   2. **I.3 Risk aversion…**
   3. **II.4 Inequality aversion!!!**

Experimental results differ from expected game outcome, because of social preferences (bibliography in phone photo). <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantal_response_equilibrium>

4.7 Conclusion – “(…) Zimbabwean villigers dislike being better off as well as being worse off than average.

* 1. **II.5 Norm compliance**
  2. **IV.10 Inrquality or Strategic Uncertainty**

1. **Set Functions, Games and Capacities in Decision Making:** First part very mathematical, maybe something in **chapter 5 Decision Under Risk and Uncertainty.** The Allais paradox.
2. **Game Theory in Action, Stephen Schecter:** Seems interesting, comprehendible examples of games
   1. **6.10 p 173The Samaritan’s dilemma:** what if my helping discourages someone from helping himself?
   2. **2.4 Israelis and Palestinians,** interesting
   3. **2.5 Global warming,** spending 0 strictly dominant.Is this similar to a game I would be considering?
   4. **Chapter 8, Alternatives to the Nash equilibrium** This is good! Photo on my phone. Evolutionary stability, something my prof likes.
   5. **10.7 Cooperators…,** photos on my phone
3. **Collective Decision Making Van Deemen/Rusinowska:** Note to self**,** Arrow’s theorem, remind myself. Overall book very mathematical and specifiv and not for me.
   1. **Chapter Rights Revisited, And Limited,** refers to Collective choice and Social Welfare
   2. **Different approaches to influence based on social networks and simple games.** Bibliography photo on my phone, maybe in the bibliography there is something relevant for me.
4. **Find this book! (w gablotce przy wejsciu do biblioteki sgh)** [**https://www.amazon.com/Taxes-Trust-Coercion-Compliance-Ukraine/dp/1108420427?tag=duckduckgo-ffab-20**](https://www.amazon.com/Taxes-Trust-Coercion-Compliance-Ukraine/dp/1108420427?tag=duckduckgo-ffab-20)
5. **Polityka publiczna… Osiński.** 
   1. **Uwarunkowania finansowe polityki publicznej Żurkowska:** OECD bada takie rzeczy jak stosunek podatków do PNB i koszt pozyskiwania podatków, tu omówione wiele takich wskaźników.
6. **Polityka społeczna… Osiński.** Chyba niezły podręcznik, kontynuować, znaleźć coś o public finance! \
7. **Polityka społeczna… Orczyk** Doktrynalne uwarunkowania polityki społecznej
8. **Super Freaconomics, chapter Unbelievable stories about apathy and altruism (see notes end of book)**

[**https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html**](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html)

[**https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html**](https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html)

[**http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/jep%20revision%20Levitt%20&%20List.pdf**](http://pricetheory.uchicago.edu/levitt/Papers/jep%20revision%20Levitt%20&%20List.pdf)

[**http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/486/1/0106\_dictator\_game.pdf**](http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/486/1/0106_dictator_game.pdf)

[**https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html**](https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/magazine/09Psychology-t.html)

[**https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm\_source=feature-box&utm\_campaign=blog&utm\_medium=web190215**](https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm_source=feature-box&utm_campaign=blog&utm_medium=web190215)

[**https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html**](https://philanthropy.iupui.edu/research/index.html)

more to explore from freaconomics bibliography!

1. **University Papers**
   1. [**https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm\_source=feature-box&utm\_campaign=blog&utm\_medium=web190215**](https://blog.philanthropy.iupui.edu/2019/02/15/dr-john-list-the-science-of-the-economics-of-philanthropy-and-the-partnership-of-two-thought-leaders/?utm_source=feature-box&utm_campaign=blog&utm_medium=web190215)
   2. **https://etheses.lse.ac.uk/**
2. **Papers from SSRN**
3. **Economics, Acemoglu List:** 
   1. **Chapter 9 Gov. as provider of public goods**
   2. **chapter 13 Game Theory:**

\*more notes in “konspect”

Trusting Bernie Madoff - extended prisoner dilemma that gives a socially inefficient result that in practice is not always the case because trust can be built, reputational concern is key.

* 1. **chapter 18 Social Economics** pics on phone

p445 – lowering taxes decreased charity! Because deductions became less valuable, the price of charity increased.

Pure vs. impure altruism, door to door study found 75% was social pressure, sume skipped schedguled solicitation, but those who didn’t spent more.

Friend Foe gameshow, watch on youtube

Introducing fairness penalty to a game.

Tax system as an ultimatum game where finally the workinhg class rejects the offer?

Willingness to punish unfairness is scale sensitive, 1$ vs 1000$

Ult game in rupees to raise the stakes.

* 1. **Ch 21.4 Income inequality**
  2. **Ch 15Time and risk**
  3. **Ch 16 econ of information**

1. **Models, Mathematics, and Methodology in Economic explanation Katzner –** Little actual math, its like, general philosophical?
2. **Taxes and Trust, Berenson –** bibliografia!
   1. !!! Economists (Joel Slemrod) view tax collection as ‘rationak decision making under uncertainty’ – “why people pay taxes” “Hobbesian model”
   2. **Readings in public choice… Rowley, Part V Applications** \*pics on phone, super bibliography AMAZING, LOOK INTO THOSE PICS
   3. 22 Public Finance Harvey Rosen
   4. 23 Taxation Winer and Hettich
      1. Fantastic definition and basics of taxation
3. **Natural justice Ken Binmore**
   1. Ch 2, bargaining \*pics on phone
      1. 2.6 social indeces
      2. 2.7 the utilitarian bargaining solution
      3. 2.8 egalitarian bargaining solution
      4. 2.10 enforcement
      5. 2.11 Cultural evolution
      6. 2.12 Hersanyi (utilitarianism) and rawles(egalitarianism) were rivals, but maybe they are saying the same thing in different ways?
   2. Ch.11 egalitarianism
      1. 11.5 Fair social contracts , self policing I think!

**Second topic: financial planning**

1. **Psychologiczne aspekty Controllingu, M. Nowak:** ciekawe rozdziały 6-7, szczególnie 6 o psychologicznych aspektach budżetowania.
   1. **Mechanizmy psychologiczne w planistycznej, budżetowej i koordynacyjnej roli kontrolera.** To nie jest tekst bardziej o strukturze, kto ma wpływ na budżetowanie, jak budżet jest potem odbierany. Rozdział 6.7 opisuje badania na temat błędu prognozy, ale to stare badanie, K.Ferris 1976. Rozdział 6.9 o reakcji na odchylenia od budżetu.
   2. **Mechanizmy psychologiczne w decyzjach inwestycyjnych:** Rozdziały 8.3-8.11 mówią o błędach myślenia przy ocenie inwestycji. 8.4, badanie efektu zakotwiczenia u finansowych profesjonalistów (Kaustia, Alho, Puttonen,2008). 8.5 Działania inwestorskie w zależności od pewności siebie (Glaser Langer Weber 2007 p.167 – 193), (Nosfinger Varma 2009) o roli płci, (Nosfinger 2003) mówi, że nastroje w społeczeństwie wpływają na optymizm planujących. 8.9 – Grupowe podejmowanie decyzji – rola controllera, ważne jest znalezienie wag poszczególnych kryteriów podejmowania decyzji, bo odruchowo argumenty są liczone, nie ważone. 8.10 – dysonans poznawczy. 8.11 Schemat działania kontrolera, żeby w organizacji były podejmowane inne decyzje, czy ja mogę coś dodać do tego? Czy może tylko konkretny przykład? Ostatni rozdział ciekawy o różnicach kulturowych. Zdjęcia bibliografii w telefonie!!!
2. **Controlling finansowy w przedsiębiorstwie:** Niezły podręcznik, dużo bibliografii po polsku, ciekawe rozdziały 2 i 6.
   1. **2.Instrumenty controllingu finansowego w przedsiębiorstwie:**
      1. **2.1 ISTOTA I ZADANIA PLANOWANIA FINANSOWEGO:** Dobry podręcznik dla mnie, baza pracy?
      2. **6.1 Ryzyko i proces zarządzania ryzykiem,** mocno o rynkach finansowych, ale może to ok?
3. **Introduction to financial models for management and planning Morris Daley:** Very expansive book. Maybe that’s good? Interesting few pages about naming cells in excel 😊. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monte_Carlo_methods_in_finance>
4. **Budżetowanie… controlling Surmacz**
5. **Budżetowanie… Dylewski**
6. **Principles of corporate finance (Brealey 2017):** Jest kilka podręczników, czy ten najlepszy? Podoba mi się, np. rozdział 13-4 do 13-5 o Behavioural finance

**Third: other reading**

1. Economics for business D.Begg D.Ward
2. Audit an introduction Piotr Staszkiewicz